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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether government support can act to increase exporting 
activity.  We use a uniquely rich data set on Irish manufacturing plants and 
employ an empirical strategy that combines a non-parametric matching 
procedure with a difference-in-differences estimator in order to deal with the 
potential selection problem inherent in the analysis.  Our results suggest that if 
grants are large enough they can encourage already exporting firms to compete 
more effectively on the international market.  However, there is little evidence 
that grants encourage non-exporters to start exporting. 
Keywords: exporting, subsidies, matching, difference-in-differences 





* The authors are grateful to Forfás for the provision of the data and to an 
anonymous referee and participants at ETSG 2005 in Dublin for helpful 
comments. Financial support through the Leverhulme Trust (Grant No. F114/BF) 
and the ESRC (Grant No. RES-000-22-0468) is gratefully acknowledged.  
 
 Section I: Introduction 
Most governments seem to take a positive view on exporting, so that the 
more firms in the economy export, the better.  In this regard it is not surprising 
that many governments have taken some initiative in encouraging firms to export.  
Despite the potential importance of using explicit policies to promote exporting 
activity, there are, however, few empirical studies that have investigated this 
issue.  One exception is the recent study by Bernard and Jensen (2004) on the 
determinants of exporting activity in the US which, amongst other things, 
investigates whether export promotion expenditures at the state level influence 
the decision of US plants to export or not.  Their findings suggest little evidence 
that such policies encourage participation in the global market by US 
manufacturers.   
Arguably, export promotion expenditures on their own may not have a 
significant effect on exporting.  Firstly, expenditure on export promotion 
measured at the state level may be masking firm specific differences in their 
ability to access information on foreign markets and, hence, heterogeneity in the 
ability to export.  Secondly, information on foreign markets per se may not be 
sufficient to ensure that firms can successfully compete on the international 
markets.  Even more important may be that firms are productive enough to do so.  
As the recent theoretical and empirical literature on firm level export activity 
argues, selling abroad involves sunk costs and it is only the “better” firms, i.e. 
those that are more efficient or productive, that are able to overcome these entry 
barriers and export successfully (Clerides et al., 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; 
Melitz, 2003).  These findings perhaps highlight the fact that other types of 
  1government support specifically targeted at improving productivity related 
aspects of the firms’ operations, to assist them in overcoming barriers to 
exporting, could prove more effective.  Examples of such relevant support 
programmes include arguably subsidies, such as for R&D and training, amongst 
others.1  However, to date there has been, as far as we are aware, no study that 
has explicitly investigated this indirect channel of government subsidies.   
  In this paper we explicitly investigate whether firm specific subsidies of all 
types can play a role in encouraging export activity.   More specifically, we take 
advantage of the case of manufacturing industries in the Republic of Ireland 
where an extensive and diverse grant support system has been used in an attempt 
to make indigenous industry more internationally competitive.  In this regard we 
have access to plant level data including, amongst many other things, the total 
amount of output exported and an exhaustive database containing information on 
all grants provided by Irish authorities.  It is important to note that these grants 
are not specifically designed to promote exporting but are related to encouraging 
investment in technology, training, or physical capital.   
  A crucial issue in estimating how government support may affect firm 
exporting activity is how to deal with the problem of what it would have been 
without government support.  Ideally, the researcher would want to observe what 
would have happened to exporting activity in the firm if it had not received a 
subsidy.  Clearly, however, this is unobservable; one can only witness a funded 
firm’s actual exports and not what it would have sold abroad without a subsidy.  
This leaves as a control group only those firms that were not subsidised.  The use 
  2of non-recipients as a comparison group, however, would only be justified if the 
provision of grants were a completely random process otherwise the analysis 
would suffer from selection bias.  In reality, of course, this is unlikely to be the 
case as authorities will select recipients among the pool of candidates according to 
some selection criteria.2   
Thus, properly identifying the effects of public funding on exporting 
activity requires generating the appropriate counterfactual in order to deal with 
the possible selection bias.  A number of econometric approaches have been 
applied to deal with this issue, including instrumental variables techniques, 
selection models, difference-in-differences estimators, or propensity score 
matching.  In their survey of the various estimation methods that can be used for 
this type of evaluation in non-experimental data, Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) 
conclude that a combination of the non-parametric propensity score matching 
with the difference-in-differences estimator is likely to considerably improve the 
accuracy of an evaluation study.  This is the technique we employ in this paper to 
investigate the impact of subsidies on plants’ export performance.   
  The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  In the following 
section we outline grant provision in Ireland.  Section III describes our data set 
and provides some preliminary empirical analysis.  We outline the matching 
procedure combined with the difference-in-difference estimator in Section IV.   
Section V contains our main results and we provide a summary and some 
concluding comments in the final section. 
 
  3Section II: Grant Provision in Ireland3
Industrial policy has arguably been an important component of the 
evolution of Irish manufacturing.  Originally based on more traditional activities, 
Irish manufacturing has evolved to become a highly modernised, technologically 
intensive sector that is an important part of the Irish economy.   More generally, 
the approach taken by industrial policy makers in trying to modernise Irish 
manufacturing has been two-pronged – on the one hand encouraging foreign 
multinationals to locate in Ireland, while at the same time encouraging indigenous 
industry to develop.  While employment creation was perhaps the more short-
term goal towards which Irish policymakers were geared, the ultimate goal was to 
make indigenous Irish industry internationally competitive and to contribute to 
enhanced economic growth. 
The agency primarily responsible for the provision of grant assistance in 
manufacturing in the modern era has been the Industrial Development Agency 
(IDA)  until 1994, after which it was split into IDA Ireland and Forbairt.  The 
former is now responsible for the grant provision to foreign owned firms while 
the latter presides over assisting indigenous plants.4  The types of grants that have 
been available to firms include capital grants, training grants, R&D grants, rent 
subsidies, employment grants, feasibility study grants, technology acquisition 
grants, loan guarantees and interest subsidies.  
While there have been some changes in the provision of grants over time, 
provision within the time period examined in our empirical analysis can be safely 
summarised as follows (see KPMG, 2003):  projects suitable for assistance had to 
either involve the production of goods primarily for export; be of an advanced 
  4technological nature for supply to international trading or skilled self supply 
firms within Ireland; and/or be in sectors of the Irish market that are subject to 
international competition.   In order to be eligible, the applicant generally has to 
show that the project required financial assistance; is viable; has an adequate 
equity capital base; and, through financial assistance, will be able to generate new 
employment or maintain existing employment in Ireland, thereby increasing 
output and value added within the Irish economy.  Additionally, there is also a 
generally more favourable view of projects that are more technology intensive 
and of a more entrepreneurial nature.  The actual grant level is generally very 
project specific and subjected to a cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, total grant 
levels can generally not exceed certain capital cost thresholds, usually between 45 
and 60 per cent.  Grants are usually paid in pre-specified instalments such that 
further payment is often subject to periodic reviews. 
 
Section III:  Data and Preliminary Empirics 
Data 
We utilise information from a number of data sources collected by Forfás, 
the policy and advisory board with responsibility for enterprise, trade, science, 
and technology in Ireland.  Our first data source is the Irish Economy Expenditure 
(IEE) survey, collected from 1983 until 1998, which then became the Annual 
Business Survey (ABS) and to which we have access until 2002.  This is an annual 
survey of Irish manufacturing plants with at least 20 employees, although a plant, 
once included, is generally still surveyed even if its employment level falls below 
this cut-off point. 5  The information available from this source that is relevant to 
  5the current paper are the level of output and exports, employment, wages, both 
total and domestically purchased inputs, nationality of ownership and sector of 
production.6   
One should note that Forfás defines foreign plants as plants that are 
majority-owned by foreign shareholders, i.e., where there is at least 50 per cent 
foreign ownership.  While, arguably, plants with a lower percentage of foreign 
ownership should still possibly be considered foreign owned, this is not 
necessarily a problem for the case of Ireland since almost all inward foreign direct 
investment has been greenfield investment rather than acquisition of local firms 
(see Barry and Bradley, 1997).  Since foreign multinationals in Irish manufacturing 
used Ireland primarily as an export base, we only use data on indigenous plants 
in our subsequent analysis. 
We also used data from the Forfás’ Research and Development (R&D) 
surveys undertaken in 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1997, and the 
Innovation Surveys 1990/1992 and 1994/1996, which provide information with 
regard to plants’ R&D activity.  These surveys are largely considered to be close to 
exhaustive of R&D undertaken by large plants in Irish manufacturing, such as 
those covered by the IEE, during the surveyed years.  This information can be 
linked to the IEE via a unique plant identifier maintained by Forfás.  Additionally, 
the ABS collected information on whether a plant incurred any R&D 
expenditures, which provides us with information on R&D activity of plants after 
1998.  We use these data sources to create a zero-one indicator of whether a plant 
  6has any R&D expenditure in the years for which the information on R&D activity 
was available.7  
We use the R&D variable as a proxy for whether a plant developed any 
new products.  Bernard and Jensen (2004) show that US plants switching into new 
products are significantly more likely to export than others.  Their definition of a 
new product is based on firms switching from one to another four-digit industry.  
Our argument is that R&D activity is a reasonable proxy for new products as it 
allows plants to diversify their goods.  In this way, R&D activity could capture the 
introduction of new products both that involved industry changes and those that 
did not.  In contrast, using industry changes as a proxy for new products only 
captures the introduction of new goods that involved changes in industry of the 
main product of the firm.8
It is important of course to verify that R&D activity is indeed correlated 
with new product generation.  In this regard some of the R&D surveys asked 
whether the R&D expenditure was used to develop new products.9  The surveys 
indicate that nearly 93 per cent of plants spent at least some of their R&D 
expenditure to develop new products.  Of those that spent some positive money 
on R&D, on average 54 per cent of the expenditure was for the development of 
new products. It thus seems reasonable to assume that R&D activity is at least 
strongly correlated with the introduction of new products.  
Importantly for the question to be addressed in this paper, Forfás also has 
an exhaustive annual database on all grant payments that have been made to 
plants in Irish manufacturing since 1972.  Again a unique numerical identifier 
  7allows us to link the grant information with the variables derived from the IEE, 
ABS, R&D and innovation surveys.  One should note that by linking information 
across data sources our sample consists of plants of generally at least 20 
employees for the years 1986-2002.10   
 
Preliminary Empirics 
  In Figure 1, we graph total exports and grant payments received by the 
plants in our sample for the years 1983-2002.  As can be seen, both variables have 
on average increased substantially over the time period considered.  Moreover, 
they seem to move in conjunction with each other.  In fact, the raw correlation 
coefficient is 0.82 and statistically significant.   
  We also provide some summary statistics in Table 1.  In line with previous 
evidence for Ireland (e.g., Ruane and Sutherland, 2005), we find that exporters are, 
on average, larger (in terms of employment) than plants that only produce for the 
domestic market.  They also pay higher wages, import a larger share of their 
inputs from abroad, and have greater R&D incidence.  Most importantly, the 
summary statistics show that exporters receive per unit of output nearly twice as 
much grant support.   
 
Section IV:  Econometric Methodology 
The major problem in evaluating the effect of government grants on 
exporting is that grant receipt is most likely not random.  Rather, certain types of 
firms may self select into the application process and the government may 
consciously select certain types of recipients among the applicants.  As stated 
  8earlier, Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) argue that a combination of matching and 
difference-in-differences analysis may be a particularly suitable approach in an 
evaluation study such as ours and we thus follow this approach here.   
Traditionally the evaluation approach has been applied to single treatment 
frameworks.  Arguably in the case of the effect of grant provision on exporting 
activity, however, it is not only whether a plant receives a grant but how much it 
receives that may matter.  Fortunately the evaluation approach has recently also 
been extended to multiple-treatment cases, see Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001), 
and we utilise this extension to allow us to investigate how different grant 
amounts have affected exporting activity.   
In this regard let there be K+1 different states, where these consist of K pre-
specified categories of mutually exclusive grant amounts and the case of no grant 
receipt (k=0).  If we denote exporting by Y, then the number of potential outcomes 
associated with each state for each plant i is  .  Letting T
K
i i i Y Y Y ,..., ,
1 0
i=k, where 
T∈{0,1,…K}, be the actual occurrence of the state of plant i, then all other elements 
in T are not observed for that plant. 
  One can use this framework to define the ‘effect of treatment on the 
treated’.  More precisely, for (K+1)K pair-wise comparisons of the average effect of 
grant amount type k relative to grant amount type k’ conditional on receipt of 
grant amount type k, the `effect of treatment on the treated’ is: 
E(Yk- Yk’|T=k) = E(Yk|T=k) - E(Yk’|T=k) for k, k’∈{0,1,…K}, k≠k’     (1)  
  9One should note that while the first term is observed in the data, none of the other 
pairwise combinations are.  In the evaluation literature one common estimator of 
these other counterfactuals is: 
E(Yk’|T=k) = EX[E(Yk’|T=k’,  X)|T=k]       (2) 
for some set of observable characteristics X.  There are two important aspects to 
note with regard to (2).  First, in order for the inner expectation of (2) to hold one 
needs to invoke what is commonly known in the literature as the conditional 
independence assumption, which requires that conditional on the value of the set 
of observable characteristics X, which themselves need to be unaffected by the 
treatment, the treatment indicator T is independent of all potential outcomes.   
Second, in order to evaluate the outer expectation it is pertinent that all 
participants in k have a counterpart in the k’ comparison group for each X for 
which one seeks to make a comparison.  In other words, one needs to find a 
‘common support’ region.  
The propensity score matching estimator (PSM) specifically addresses the 
potential problem of ‘common support’.  More precisely, the PSM estimator can 
help eliminate the bias due to differences in the supports of X in the treated and 
non-treated groups and the bias due to differences in the two groups in the 
distribution of X over its common support by `matching’ similar individuals 
across these two groups.   In terms of implementing this estimator one normally 
would like to match individual units across a number of observable 
characteristics.  However, in this regard it would be difficult to determine along 
which dimension to match the plants, or what type of weighting scheme to use. 
  10To overcome this dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest 
the use of a propensity score generated from modelling the probability of the 
treatment, and this method can be easily extended within a multiple treatment 
framework of pair-wise comparisons.  One should note in this regard that Lechner 
(2001) pointed out that when comparing two ‘treatment groups’ the existence of 
multiple treatments can be ignored since these other individuals are not needed 
for identification. 
Accordingly, we first identify the probability of grant amount type k 
receipt compared to grant amount type k’ receipt (or 'propensity score') 
conditional on a set of observables X using the following probit model: 
P(Tit=k|T Tit=k, k’) = F(X)         ( 3 )  
A k’ grant amount type plant j, which is ‘closest’ in terms of its ‘propensity score’ 
to a k type grant amount plant i, is then selected as a match for the latter using the 
‘caliper’ matching method.11  More formally, for each grant type k receiving plant 
i, a grant type k’ plant j is selected such that for the predicted probability,  , of 
receiving a k type grant at time t  of grant recipient plant i and the predicted 
probability,  , of receiving a k type grant at time t for k’ type grant recipient 




} ' { jt it k j jt it P P P P − = − >
∈ λ        ( 4 )    
where  λ is a pre-specified scalar which defines the boundary for the 
neighbourhood where matching is allowed.  If none of the k’ grant type recipients 
plants is within λ of the k type recipient i, it is left unmatched. This procedure is 
done for all (K+1)K type combinations.  
  11  Despite its appeal in addressing the ‘common support’ problem, the PSM 
estimator still crucially rests on the conditional independence assumption.  In 
other words, in using the PSM it is pertinent that one can convincingly argue that 
the data at hand is sufficiently rich for this to be reasonable and/or that one 
supplements the PSM with another estimator to overcome this strong assumption.  
We thus combine our PSM matching procedure with a difference-in-differences 
(DID) estimator, which compares the change in the outcome variable for the k 
treated groups with the change in the outcome variable for all none k type grant 
amount recipients, and thus can purge further time invariant effects from the 
specification.  Accordingly, let 
k Y Δ  be the difference in exporting before and after 
receiving a grant of amount k, and difference this with respect to the before and 
after differences for all comparison control groups, say 
k k Y
≠ Δ
' .  One then obtains 
the difference-in-differences estimator  .  In terms of practical 
implementation this amounts to estimating: 
k k k Y Y





it it G Y ε α + Δ ∂ + = Δ ∑
1
             ( 5 )  
where Δ is  a time differencing operator over t-1 to t and Gk are a k set of grant 
amount category dummies.  Essentially this DID estimator combined with PSM 
allows us to purge all time invariant unobservables from our relationship of 
interest in the matched sample.   
However, even this combined estimation approach might leave one with a 
potential problem of unobserved effects if these are time varying.  For example, 
firms may get a good idea, apply for a grant and also increase their exporting 
activity even in the absence of a grant (e.g., Kauko, 1996, Jaffe, 2002).  If this is the 
  12case for both successful and non-successful applicants then this should not cause a 
problem in our approach.  If, however, this is more likely to be the case for 
successful applicants, then our approach would likely overstate the potential 
additionality of grant receipt.  Unfortunately, we cannot completely rule out this 
possibility, but instead need to make the argument that our data is rich enough so 
that no other time varying unobservables that may be correlated with grant 
receipt and exporting remain.     
Finally, one must consider the appropriate nature of the dependent 
variable Y.  First, feasibly grant support may induce already exporting plants to 
export more.  Additionally it may also be the case that the loosening of financial 
constraints via subsidies could induce non-exporters to commence selling some of 
their output on the world market (e.g., Du and Girma, 2006; Greenaway et al., 
2005).  In order to deal with both of these aspects we use alternatively two 
dependent variables.  The first one is the incidence of exporting – a zero-one 
dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the plant is exporting and zero 
otherwise.  The second is the log of total exports for exporting incumbents.   
 
Section V: Empirical Results 
Propensity Score Matching Results 
Importantly our information on grant receipt provides us with the actual 
amount of each grant and thus allows us to examine the impact beyond grant 
receipt incidence.  However, taking grant size into account and using the 
propensity score matching simultaneously necessarily restricts us to grouping 
  13grant amounts into pre-defined categories.  In this regard, the more categories we 
allow for, the less we are assuming away within-heterogeneity in the sense that 
different grant amounts within categories may have different impacts on 
exporting.    But, the greater the amount of categories one chooses the more 
infeasible in terms of our sample size and implementation will PSM be, since K 
categories require the matching of (K+1)K different combinations.  Moreover, the 
choice of categories is to some extent arbitrary unless one has  clearly grounded a 
priori expectations of what `threshold amounts’ would be reasonable.   
With these aspects in mind and after considerable experimentation we 
proceeded with using three different grant size categories, which for the sake of 
convenience we termed small, medium, and large, and defined respectively as the 
amounts that fall below the 33.3 percentile, within the 33.3 to 66.6 percentile, and 
above the 66.6 percentile of the entire distribution of subsidies over the full 
sample period.  Therefore, we are slicing the entire distribution of grants into 
three equally probable groups.  In terms of actual amounts, this corresponds to 
categorizing grants less than 22,947 Euros as small, between 22,947 and 87,769 
Euros as medium, and those above 87,769 Euros as large (all measured in 1998 
prices).           
In implementing PSM on our three grant categories one would ideally like 
to use a set of covariates X that capture, or are correlated with, the factors that 
authorities may take into account when deciding on handouts of grants as 
discussed above in Section II. As noted, Irish policy makers were keen on 
supporting firms that were export oriented, entrepreneurial, technology intensive, 
  14skill intensive, linked to the local economy, and likely to be financially 
constrained.  In terms of the information that our data sets provide, we identified 
the following plant level characteristics that may be important in this regard: size 
(employment), domestic input use (domestically purchased intermediates over 
total intermediates), new product development (dummy equal one if positive 
R&D expenditure), average wage, domestic ownership, age, and a dummy for 
previous export activity.  We use lagged values of these variables in order to 
ensure our covariates are unaffected by grant receipt (or the anticipation of it); see 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005).  Finally, we also included a dummy variable 
indicating whether the plant received a grant in the previous year in case there are 
links in payments across years. 
As a next step we calculated propensity scores and used the matching 
estimator as previously outlined to create our control and treatment groups.12  In 
doing so, from a total amount of 6728 non-recipient, 1636 small grant recipient, 
1639 medium grant recipient, and 1727 large grant recipient observations we were 
able to match 2463, 1549, 1521, and 1495 observations, respectively.   We assess the 
matching quality of this procedure using a variety of indicators shown in Table 2.  
For instance, as can be seen the pseudo R-squared of running the same probits 
with only the matched sample is multiple times lower in all cases except where 
non-grant receipt is used as the treatment group.  We also, as suggested by 
Rosenbaum and Rosin (1985), calculated the standardized bias of the propensity 
scores for our individual matching pairs as: 













=        ( 6 )  
  15where P is the propensity score, 
_
P represents its average, and V its variance.  One 
finds from the resulting figures in Table 2 that the bias reduction is considerable, 
ranging anywhere from 35 to 90 percent.  Thus, the matching quality indicators 
are clearly supportive of our underlying matching procedure.    
       
Econometric Results on the Treatment Effect 
In order to estimate the effect of grant provision on exporting we started 
with the benchmark specification: 
it it L it M it S it LARGE MEDIUM SMALL Y ε β β β α + + + + =     (7) 
where  SMALL,  MEDIUM, and LARGE are zero-one type dummies indicating 
whether a plant received a small, medium, or large sized subsidy, and ε is a 
random error term.  The dependent variable is defined alternatively as the log of 
total exports or incidence of exporting (dummy = 1 if plant exports).13   
We first estimate (7) with the log level of exports as dependent variable 
using the total sample (unmatched) with simple OLS.  This is thus the benchmark 
case of the effect of government subsidies on exporting intensity of already 
exporting firms.14  The resultant statistically significant coefficients, shown in the 
first row of Table 3, are negative for small grants but positive for medium and 
large grants.  This would, somewhat peculiarly, suggest that grants seem to 
discourage exporting if they are small, but are effective in promoting further 
exporting activity in firms if they are medium or large.   
Clearly, there are many other factors that affect both grant receipt and the 
intensity of exporting among exporters, thus potentially biasing our estimates.  If 
  16these are assumed to be time invariant then they can be purged by simply first 
differencing equation (7).  Our estimates from this exercise are shown in the 
second row of Table 3.  As can be seen, this dramatically changes any conclusions 
drawn from the coefficients obtained from our initial estimation.  For the overall 
sample one finds that there are now only significant effects for large grants 
recipients, thus indicating that perhaps a grant needs to be large enough to 
further help a plant compete on the international market. 
We then proceed to investigating how government support may affect the 
incidence of exporting (rows 3-4).  Using a simple probit model one finds that, 
regardless of size category, government subsidies encourage plants to export in 
Irish manufacturing.  Comparing the size of the coefficients suggests, however, 
that while all sizes of grants may have a positive effect on plants incidence of 
exporting, the larger the grant the more likely a firm will export.  Again we 
examined whether time invariant effects may be biasing our estimates by first 
differencing our data and then running OLS.  However, we now find no 
statistically significant evidence that grants encourage firms to become exporters.   
In order to assess whether our results may thus far have been driven by the 
potential problem of ‘common support’, as discussed in Section IV, we then 
proceeded to use our matched sample to estimate a first differenced version of 
(7).15  One should note that this is precisely the combined matching difference-in-
difference estimator of equation (5), and the estimated coefficients clearly indicate 
that employing this can have substantial effects on any conclusions drawn.  More 
precisely, while still only large grants have a positive effect on the export intensity 
  17of exporting plants, the magnitude of the coefficient is substantially lower than in 
the OLS estimation in row 1, suggesting that not ensuring common support tends 
to overestimate the effect in our case.   In terms of export incidence we now find 
no effect of government support, regardless of the size of the grant.   Clearly, thus, 
our results suggest that a multiple treatment matching framework can potentially 
avoid considerable bias due to sample selection. 
 One possible concern with the matching estimator may be, given that it is 
based on a multidimensionality of firm characteristics, that our results are driven 
by the possibility that larger plants export more and are also more likely to 
receive a grant.  As a matter of fact, Bernard and Jensen (2004) show that 
employment is an important determinant of the propensity to export, while 
Barrios et al (2003) find a similar result in terms of the impact on export intensity.  
Although our matching procedure is intended to create samples of ‘similar’ plants 
across all relevant characteristics - including size, which we measure by 
employment -  the use of the summary score in the face of multi-dimensionality of 
characteristics may feasibly result in less than perfect matching in this regard.  To 
investigate this, we therefore also include employment as an explanatory variable 
in our regression.  As can be seen, reassuringly the results remain the same.    
 
 
Section VI: Concluding Remarks 
We investigated the relationship between government support and 
exporting activity.  To this end, we used a uniquely rich data set on Irish 
manufacturing plants and employed an empirical strategy that combined a non-
  18parametric matching procedure with a difference-in-differences estimator in order 
to deal with the potential selection problem inherent in such an analysis.  Our 
results suggest that if grants are large enough they can encourage already 
exporting firms to compete more effectively on the international market.   
However, there is little evidence that grants encourage non-exporters to start 
exporting.   
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics by Exporting Status 
TYPE: EXPORTER  NON-EXPORTER 
 Mean  St.Dev  Mean  St. Dev. 
WAGE  23.52  16.77  22.72  13.52 
DOM. INPUTS  0.55  0.29  0.60  0.32 
GRANT/SALES  18.34  383.77  6.76  52.24 
RD INCIDENCE  0.379  ---  0.341  --- 
EMPLOYMENT  95.00  208.51  60.46  133.76 
 
 
Table 2 –  Indicators of Matching Quality 











SMALL No  Grant  Total  1229 997  0.146  0.013  0.914 
MEDIUM No  Grant  Total  1209 997  0.208  0.019  0.908 
LARGE No  Grant  Total  1247 997  0.267  0.028  0.896 
SMALL MEDIUM  Total  1229 1209  0.040  0.018  0.546 
SMALL LARGE Total  1229 1247  0.111  0.042  0.622 
MEDIUM LARGE  Total  1209 1247  0.059  0.019  0.683 
No Grant  SMALL  Total  997 1229 0.146  0.096  0.341 
No Grant  MEDIUM  Total  997 1209 0.208  0.133  0.362 
No Grant  LARGE  Total  997 1247 0.267  0.162  0.394 
MEDIUM SMALL  Total  1209 1229  0.040  0.013  0.668 
LARGE SMALL Total  1247 1229  0.111  0.027  0.759 
LARGE MEDIUM  Total  1247 1209  0.059  0.020  0.658 
 





SMALL MEDIUM LARGE  EMPLOYMENT  Obs. 
No Level  No  -0.246** 0.154* 1.118**    5931 
    (0.073) (0.070) (0.066)     
No Level  Yes  0.006 0.001 0.046*    5931 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)    
No Incidence  No  0.418** 0.641** 1.032**    8749 
    (0.049) (0.052) (0.063)    
No Incidence  Yes  0.005 0.005 -0.003    8749 
    (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)     
Yes Level  Yes  -0.002 -0.009  0.054**   3757 
    (0.019) (0.019) (0.017)    
Yes Level  Yes  -0.001 -0.010  0.048**  0.084**  3757 
    (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)  (0.009)   
Yes Incidence  Yes  0.007 0.010 0.002   4329 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Yes Incidence  Yes  0.007 0.009 0.002  0.0001**  4329 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.0000)   
 
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) For 
the matched sample standard errors are 
generated via bootstrapping (500 replications). (3) 
** and * represent one and five per cent 
significance levels, respectively. 




















































Notes: Both series in 2002 prices and millions of Euros. 
 
 
  24Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Well known examples include the Small Business Innovation Program in the US (Wallsten, 2000) 
or R&D support available from the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) in Israel (Lach, 2002)  
2 Moreover, awareness of these criteria may mean that plants will self select themselves into the 
application process. 
3 See Meyler and Strobl (2000) for a more detailed discussion. 
4 After 1998 Forbairt become Enterprise Ireland as a consequence of a merger with the Irish Trade 
board. 
5 To be precise, in the ABS (since 1999) the official threshold cut-off point was plants with at least 
10 employees.  However, by 1998 there were a considerable amount of plants in the IEE with less 
than 20 employees, and we thus did not drop these from either of the two sources.  One should 
note that we did experiment with excluding observations from both that fell below 20, but this 
made essentially no qualitative and quantitative difference in our results.  
6 All nominal variables are appropriately deflated by the consumer price index as there are no 
official sector level price deflators available to us. 
7 Unfortunately not all surveys have information on the actual expenditure figures. 
8 Unfortunately Forfás does not keep track of industry changes of plants rather plants remain 
classified by industry as they are first tracked in the data. However, the view of Forfás is that in 
Ireland very few plants would change industries in terms of their main products.  Part of the 
reason for this may be that due to the structural changes in Irish manufacturing since EU entry in 
1973, most new plants were entering industries relatively new to Ireland. 
9 This question was posed in the 1986, 1990, 1991, 1995, and 1997 surveys. 
10 Obviously years during this sample period where there was missing information from the R&D 
and innovation surveys had to be dropped.  Since we used this information as lagged controls in 
our matching this meant dropping observations for the years 1986, 1988, 1990, and 1999.   
11 The matching is performed in STATA Version 8 using the software provided by Sianesi (2001). 
12 We use a value of λ equal to 0.1. 
13 We use the logged value in order to take account of outliers.  In order to avoid the dropping of 
observations where exporting was zero, we set expenditure in levels equal to one Euro for these.    
14 While we used the unmatched sample, one should note that we reduced the data to include only 
observations for which we could also run a first differenced version of (7) in order to keep our 
sample size consistent across unmatched estimation types.  
15 One should note that for this specification we have calculated bootstrapped standard errors 
(using 500 replications) as suggested by Lechner (2002) since the use of a matching procedure 
further complicates the calculation of the actual estimation variance.  
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